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Identifying the Fake Base Station: A Location Based Approach
Ke-Wen Huang, Hui-Ming Wang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Fake base station (FBS) attack is a great security
challenge to wireless user equipment (UE). During the cell selec-
tion stage, the UE receives multiple synchronization signals (SSs)
from multiple nearby base stations (BSs), and then synchronizes
itself with the strongest SS. A FBS also can transmit a SS with
sufficient power to confuse the UE, which makes the UE connect
to the FBS, and may lead to the leakage of private information.
In this letter, countermeasure to the FBS attack by utilizing
the location information is investigated. Two location awareness
based FBS-resistance schemes are proposed by checking the
received signal strength according to the position of the UE
and a legitimate BS map. The successful cheating rate (SCR)
definded as the probability that the UE will connect to the FBS
is investigated. Numeric results show that with the two proposed
schemes, the SCR can be greatly reduced especially when the
transmit power of the FBS is large. Beyond that, a cooperation
aided method is further proposed to improve the performance,
and we show that the cooperation aided method can further
suppress the SCR when the signal strength from the FBS is
similar to that from the legitimate BS.
Index Terms—Fake base station, location awareness, physical
layer authentication, detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The initial cell selection (CS) stage during which an user
equipment (UE) searches for a suitable base station (BS) to
camp on is vulnerable to a fake base station (FBS) attack. In
the CS stage, the UE keeps listening to the wireless broadcast
channel and searches for the synchronizing signal (SS) from
surrounding base stations (BSs). After that, the UE selects a
suitable BS based on the received SSs, and then begins to
establish a wireless connection with the BS [1]. If a FBS
transmits a spoofing SS during the CS stage with sufficiently
high power (referred to as the SS spoofing attack [2]), the UE
may be attracted by and attempt to camp on the FBS rather
than any legitimate BS (LBS) [3], [4]. Currently, the widely-
used authentication method for the UE to distinguish the FBS
from the LBSs is based on encryption. However, though the
FBS will fail during the key-based authentication procedure,
it still significantly degrades the system performance, for
example, the FBS can lead to the significant increase of the
delay before the UE can successfully connect to the legitimate
network and more seriously, if the FBS further spoof the
control signal, it can even cause the access denial to the
network [3], [4].
Recently, using the physical layer parameters to authenticate
the signal source, namely physical layer authentication, has
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gained considerable attention which does not depends on
any private key, see [8] and references therein 1. For exam-
ple, channel impulse response and device fingerprint based
schemes were proposed in [6] and [7], respectively, to verify
the transmitter’s identity. However, these methods are almost
impossible to be exploited to combat with the SS spoofing
attack because they require the pre-recorded estimations of the
physical layer parameters which is impossible to be obtained
during the CS stage, as in this stage, there is exactly no
wireless connection between the UE and any LBS. To combat
with the SS spoofing attack, in this letter, we propose a
location-based physical layer approach. To the best of our
knowledge, no existing literature is specifically focused on
this issue.
Our proposed schemes require that the UE knows its own
position and the locations of the LBSs. Note that this require-
ment is not hard to satisfy in view of the facts that nowadays,
the UE (such as a smartphone) is usually equipped with a
positioning module (GPS) so that the UE can know its own
position, and the locations of the LBSs are generally fixed and
invariant which can be also known by the UE via an off-line
map (GoogleMap in a smartphone).
Our main idea is that with the location information of the
UE and LBSs, taking the path loss, the shadowing effect and
the small-scale fading into consideration, the average received
synchronization signal strength (ARSSS) from LBSs should
be within a proper range. On the other hand, a FBS usually
transmits with a high power level to attract the UE [2]. The UE
can check the ARSSS and once the ARSSS exceed its normal
range, it is reasonable to suspect that the corresponding SS
is transmitted from a FBS. Note that location awareness has
been proposed to improve the performance of future networks,
e.g., in [9], but has not been utilized for the UEs to identify
the FBS. The major benefit of the proposed methods in this
letter is that once the ARSSSs are obtained, they can make a
decision immediately, while the conventional key-based meth-
ods require the UE to synchronize itself with the SS possibly
transmitted by the FBS. The contributions of this letter are
summarized as follows: 1) based on the location information,
we provide two different ARSSS checking criterions, which
are referred as suspicious ARSSS region (SAR) criterion
and maximum-likelihood (ML) criterion, respectively; 2) by
taking the shadow fading and small-scale fading effects into
consideration, the successful cheating rates (SCR), defined as
the probability that a given UE will connect to the FBS, are
derived for our proposed methods; 3) a cooperative ARSSS
checking scheme is proposed to improve the performance
1We note that physical layer based approach has also been extensive
investigated to secure data transmission in wireless channel, namely physical
layer security, as a complementary scheme to the conventional cryptography-
based scheme, see [5] and references therein.
2when the ARSSS from the FBS approaches to that from the
closest LBS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first introduce our system model. Then
we evaluate the SCR of a given UE when there is no security
mechanism during the CS stage.
A comprehensive system model is given in Fig. 1. We
consider that there are M LBSs, referred to as LBS 1,
LBS 2, · · · , LBS M , and a FBS around the considered
UE broadcasting mutually orthgonal SSs, denoted by Z ,
{z1, z2, · · · , zM+1}, to enable the nearby UEs to connect to
them. Assume zm ∈ Cτ , m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, and zM+1 ∈ Cτ
are the SS transmitted by the m-th LBS and the FBS, where
τ is the length of the SSs satisfying τ ≥ M + 1. For
m = 1, 2, · · · ,M+1, we assume that ‖zm‖2 = τ . During the
CS stage, the UE first searches the existence of the SSs and
obtains the set Z 2. Then it keeps listening to the SSs for a
total of L observing time slots (TSs) and record the ARSSS
of each SS. Finally, we assume the UE synchronize itself to
the SS with largest ARSSS 3.
The received signal at the UE during the l-th TS is
y [l] =
M+1∑
m=1
√
PmΨmd
−α/2
m hm [l] zm + n [l] , (1)
where {dm, hm[l],Ψm, Pm}, for m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M},
and {dM+1, hM+1[l],ΨM+1, PM+1} are the distance, the
Rayleigh small scale fading factor during the l-th TS, the log-
normal shadow fading, and the transmit power of the m-th
LBS and the FBS, respectively, n [l] ∼ CN (0, σ2I) is the
received noise, and α is the exponential factor of the path
loss. We assume the log-normal shadow fading factors remain
unchanged during the whole L TSs, and they are identically
and independently distributed as N (0, σ2Ψ) in decibels, and
all the Rayleigh small scale fading factors are identically and
independently distributed as CN (0, σ2h). For simplicity, we
assume that the LBSs transmit with the same power P , i.e.,
P = P1 = P2 = · · · = PM .
Matching y [l] with zm, for m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M + 1}, the
UE obtains the output power, which can be written as
pm [l] , |y [l]zHm |2/τ =
∣∣∣√PmΨmd−αm hm [l] + nm [l]∣∣∣2 ,
where nm [l] , n [l] z
H
m/τ
2 ∼ CN (0, σ2/τ). Note that in
general, the SSs are designed to be detectable at a low SNR
[2], and therefore for simplicity, we assume that the noise
term nm [l] can be neglected. In fact, by increasing τ , the
impact of the noise gets smaller. Therefore, we have pm [l] ≈
Pmd
−α
m Ψm |hm [l]|2, for m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M + 1}.
2This can be simply realized by matching all the possible SSs with the
received signal and check whether the output power exceeds a pre-designed
threshold. For simplicity, we assume all the SSs in Z can be successfully
detected in this letter.
3The 3GPP specification requires the UE to search for the strongest cell
except for the some special cases such as when the strongest cell is in “barred”
status [10]. For simplicity, in this letter, we only consider the situation where
the UE is able to connect to the strongest cell to provide a basic understanding
of the effect of the FBS attack. Other special cases are more complicated and
are left for future research.
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Fig. 1: System model with three LBSs and one FBS.
The ARSSS of the m-th SS, i.e., zm, is defined as
Sm ,
1
L
L∑
l=1
lt (pm [l]) = Um +
1
L
L∑
l=1
Xm [l] , (2)
where we have lt (x) , 10 log10 (x), Xm [l] , 2lt (|hm [l]|),
and Um , lt (Pm)− αlt (dm) + lt (Ψm).
We have to emphasize here that at this stage, the UE only
obtain the set of SSs from surrounding BSs (both LBSs and
FBS), i.e., Z , and the corresponding set of the ARSSSs,
denoted by S , {S1, S2, · · · , SM+1}, but for each received
SS, the UE does not know which BS is the signal source.
Based on (2), we can evaluate the SCR when there is no
authentication mechanism for the UE to distinguish the FBS
from the LBSs during the CS stage. We denote the SCR as
PS , then we have
PS , P
{
SM+1 > Sˆ
}
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fM+1 (x)
M∏
m=1
Fm (x) dx,
where Sˆ , max
1≤m≤M
Sm, and for 1 ≤ m ≤ M + 1, fm(x)
and Fm(x) are the probability density function (PDF) and
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Sm, respectively.
According to the central-limit theorem, as L becomes large,
Sm is asymptotically distributed as N
(
um, σ
2
S
)
, where um ,
lt(σ2hPm)− αlt (dm)− γ and σ2S , σ2Ψ + 1Lσ2X with γ being
the Eular’s constant and σ2X ,
(
γ + lt
(
σ2h
))2
+ pi
2
6 . Therefore,
we have
PS .= 1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
t2
2
M∏
m=1
Φ
(
t+
uM+1 − um
σS
)
dx,
where Φ(x) is the CDF of a standard Gaussian random
variable, and “
.
=” means “asymptotically equals to” under the
condition that L → +∞. It should be pointed out that, if
uM+1 − um is sufficiently large for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M , then
PS → 1, which means that the UE almost always choose to
connect to the FBS.
Remark 1. In practice, the different SSs from the different
BSs usually arrive at the UE in an asynchronous manner. How-
ever, for simplicity of mathematical description, we assumed
that the different SSs simultaneously arrive the UE as in (1).
Note that this simplification does not change the basic process
during the CS stage.
III. IDENTIFY THE FBS THROUGH ARSSS
In this section, based on the UE’s own position and the
prior locations information of the LBSs according to an off-
line map, we provide two practical methods to combat with
the SS spoofing attack at the UE-side during the CS stage.
3With the location information, we assume the UE knows um
for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M and σ2S .
Once the UE obtains Z and S, we provide the following
two criterions which allow the UE to choose a SS from the
observed SS set Z in a more secure manner. The basic idea
is that by checking the relative locations of the UE itself and
LBSs in the map, the ARSSS from LBSs should within a
proper range. A significant large ARSSS could be suspected
to be from the FBS. For notational simplicity, in this section,
we denote the final SS chosen by the UE as z∗.
A. SAR based ARSSS checking
As in current cellular networks, the UE always searches
the strongest cell, the greedy FBS may transmit with a higher
power level than the LBSs to attract the UE [2]. Therefore,
we define a SAR for the ARSSSs in S, which is denoted by
I , (S¯,+∞). More specifically, all the elements in S that
are within I will be suspected to be from the FBS, and the
UE should synchronize itself to the strongest SS in S \ I.
Here, S¯ is chosen such that P
{
Sˆ > S¯
}
≤ δ with 0 < δ < 1
being a small pre-designed value, which is similar to the false
alarm rate in hypothesis test theory [11]. Note that we have
P
{
Sˆ > S¯
}
.
= 1 −∏Mm=1 (1−Q( S¯−umσS
))
, and the value
of S¯ can be searched through a bisection method. As a result,
in the SAR based method, we have z∗ = zmˆ with Smˆ =
argmaxs∈S\I s.
As we have assumed that zM+1 is transmitted by the FBS,
under the proposed strategy, the SCR satisfies
PS = P {z∗ = zM+1}
(a)
≤ P
{
Sˆ < SM+1 < S¯
}
+ δ
.
=
1√
2pi
∫ S¯−uM+1
σS
−∞
e−
t2
2
M∏
m=1
Φ
(
t+
uM+1 − um
σS
)
dt+ δ,
where the inequality in (a) is obtained by assuming that the
UE will always connect to the FBS if Sˆ > S¯. In the following
two reasonable scenarios, S¯ can be approximated by some
simple and computationally efficient expressions:
1) when the UE is much closer to one of the LBS: For
example, when the UE is much closer to LBS 1, then we have
u1 ≫ um for m = 2, 3, · · · ,M , and Sˆ ≈ S1. Therefore, we
have P
{
Sˆ > S¯
}
≈ P {S1 > S¯} .= Q( S¯−u1σS
)
. Accordingly,
we can obtain S¯ ≈ σSQ−1 (δ) + u1.
2) when the UE is at the coverage edge of several LBSs:
For example, when the UE is at the coverage edge of LBS 1,
LBS 2,· · · , and LBS K, then we have u1 ≈ u2 ≈ · · · ≈ uK ≫
uj , for K + 1 ≤ j ≤ M . Therefore, we have P
{
Sˆ > S¯
}
≈
P
{
max
1≤k≤K
Sk > S¯
}
≈ 1−
(
1−Q
(
S¯−u1
σS
))K
. Accordingly,
we can obtain S¯ ≈ σSQ−1
(
1− k√1− δ)+ u1.
B. ML based ARSSS checking
In this subsection, we introduce a ML based method for
the UE to choose a proper SS. Different from the SAR based
method where the ARSSSs are compared with a pre-designed
threshold, the ML based method determines a SS by directly
checking the likelihood function [11]. More specifically, z∗
satisfies z∗ = zmˇ with mˇ = argmaxm fmax (Sm) and
fmax (x) =
∑M
k=1 fk (x)
∏M
m=1,m 6=k Fm (x) being the PDF
of Sˆ. Obviously, the main idea behind the ML based ARSSS
checking method is that the UE chooses the SS which is most
likely to be a realization of Sˆ.
Under the ML based ARSSS checking strategy, the SCR
can be written as
PS = P
{
fmax (SM+1) > max
1≤m≤M
fmax (Sm)
}
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fM+1(x)
M∏
m=1
{∫
Ω(x)
fm (t) dt
}
dx (3)
where Ω (x) , {t|fmax(t) < fmax(x)} .
In general, numerical calculation of (3) is involved due to
the fact that Ω (x) does not have a closed form expression.
For a special case when the UE is much closer to one of
the LBS, for example LBS 1, we have fmax(x) ≈ f1(x) .=
1√
2piσS
exp
(
− (x−u1)2
2σ2
S
)
, and thus
Ω (x) ≈
{
{t|t < x or t > 2u1 − x} , x < u1
{t|t < 2u1 − x or t > x} , x ≥ u1
. (4)
C. Numerical example & Discussion
In Fig. 2, we plot PS versus uM+1 when there is no
ARSSS checking and when the SAR or ML based schemes
are utilized. As we can see, with the increase of uM+1, the
UE will connect to the FBS with probability approaching one.
However, with the proposed two ARSSS checking methods,
for large uM+1, the FBS will be easily distinguished by the
UE, and in this cases, PS becomes very small. We note that
each of the proposed schemes has its own advantages and
disadvantages. We observe that within a vast range value of
uM+1, the ML scheme outperforms the SAR scheme in term
of suppressing the SCR PS . This is because the ML based
scheme tends to find the SS that is most likely to be from the
LBSs. However, the complexity of the ML scheme is much
higher than the SAR scheme. The SAR scheme only needs to
compare the largest ARSSS with a pre-given number while the
ML requires to calculate fmax(x), which involves exponential
and Q functions, for M + 1 times. As for the SAR scheme,
it associates the UE with the BS who provides the strongest
signal strength out of the suspicious power region. As a result,
conditioning on the UE will connect to a LBS, the BS selected
by the SAR scheme may provide a higher link capacity than
that by the ML scheme.
IV. COOPERATION AIDED ARSSS CHECKING
In this section, we introduce a method to further improve the
performance of identifying the FBS by utilizing the coopera-
tive nodes (CNs). We assume there are several geometrically
distributed and friendly cooperative nodes (CNs) around the
UE 4. For simplicity, we only consider the cases where the
UE is close to one LBS, and the ARSSSs from other LBSs
4For example, the CNs can be other legitimate but idle UEs
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Fig. 2: PS versus uM+1, where we set M = 3, d1 = 80 (m),
d2 = 250 (m), d3 = 250 (m), P = 40 (dBm), σ
2
h = 1, σ
2
Ψ = 3,
L = 10, α = 3, and δ = 0.01.
is much lower than the closest one, and thus those LBSs are
neglected. More general scenarios are left for future works. To
facilitate the proposed method, reliable communication links
between the UE and the CNs are required. This can be realized
by the techniques such as device-to-device communication.
The basic idea here is that except for the UE, the CNs
also record the ARSSSs of the their received SSs. Then, the
CNs feed their ARSSSs back to the UE. With these extra
information provided by the CNs, the UE can make a more
secure decision.
Denote the PDF of the ARSSS from the LBS to the i-th
CN as fC,i(x). According to the central-limit theorem, we
have fC,i(x)
.
= 1√
2piσS
exp
(
− (x−uC,i)2
2σ2
S
)
, where uC,i is the
mean value of the ARSSS from the LBS to the i-th CN which
can be obtained from the location information of the LBS and
the i-th CN. During the CS stage, both the UE and the CNs
receives two strong SSs. Without loss of generality, the two
SSs are denoted by z1 and z2. For j ∈ {1, 2}, the ARSSSs
of zj at the UE and the i-th CN are denoted by Sj and Sj,i,
respectively.
With the help of the CNs, we summarize a detailed steps for
the UE to distinguish the SS of the LBS as follows: 1) when
the UE is much closer to one LBS but observes two strong
SSs, i.e., z1 and z2, the UE broadcasts the index of the two
indistinguishable SSs to nearby CNs; 2) The i-th CN observes
the ARSSSs of these two SSs, and feeds back the values of
fC,i (S1,i) and fC,i (S2,i); 3) The UE obtains the feedback
from the CNs and determines that zj∗ is the SS from the
LBS, where j∗ = argmaxj∈{1,2} f1 (Zj)
∏
i fC,i (Sj,i).
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
CN aided ARSSS checking method in terms of SCR. In our
simulation, the UE and the LBS are located at (0, 0) and
(0, RL), respectively. The simulation is carried out for 10000
realizations. For each realization, two CNs are uniformly and
randomly generated within R (rC), and a FBS is uniformly
and randomly generated within R (rO) \R (rI), where R (x)
denotes the ball region whose center and radius are (0, 0) and
x, respectively. As we can see from Fig. 3, with the extra
information provided by the CNs, the SCR is greatly reduced.
This is mainly due to the fact that with more distributed nodes
recording the ARSSS, we obtain a higher resolution when
distinguishing the location of the source of the received SS,
and with the prior location information of the LBSs, we can
identify the FBS in a more reliable manner. From Fig. 3, we
can also observe that different from the cases without ARSSS
checking, when the proposed methods are adopted, the SCR
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Fig. 3: PS versus PM+1, P = 40 (dBm), σ
2
h = 1, σ
2
Ψ = 3, L = 10,
α = 3, RL = 100 m, rC = 50 m, rO = 150 m, rI = 90 m and
δ = 0.01.
reaches the maximum when the FBS uses a moderate transmit
power level. This is because in this case, the ARSSSs from
the FBS and the LBS are less different, which makes it harder
to distinguish between them.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed two location based schemes to
combat the SS spoofing attack, i.e., the SAR and the ML based
method. We showed via numerical results that both the SAR
and the ML based method deal well with the SS spoofing
attack when the malicious FBS is greedy who adopts a large
transmit power. Besides, we also proposed a cooperation based
method to further enhance the performance of combating the
SS spoofing attack. It is shown that with the cooperation based
method, the SDR can be greatly reduced in a vast range of
spoofing power.
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